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Abstract
While linkages between some macroeconomic phenomena (e.g. unemployment, GDP
growth) and suicide rates in some countries have been explored, only one study, hitherto,
has established a causal relationship between fiscal consolidation and suicide, albeit in a
single country. This study examines the impact of budget consolidation on suicide mortality
across all Eurozone peripheral economies, while controlling for various economic and socio-
demographic differences. The impact of fiscal adjustments is found to be gender, age and
time specific. In particular, fiscal consolidation has short–, medium– and long–run suicide
increasing effects on the male population between 65 and 89 years of age. A one percentage
point reduction in government spending is associated with an 1.39%, 2.35% and 2.64% in-
crease in the short–, medium– and long–run, respectively, of male suicides rates between 65
and 89 years of age in the Eurozone periphery. These results are highly robust to alternative
measures of fiscal consolidation. Unemployment benefits and substantial employment protec-
tion legislation seem to mitigate some of the negative effects of fiscal consolidation on suicide
mortality. Plausible explanations for these impacts are provided and policy implications
drawn.
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1 Introduction
Although fiscal consolidation is widely discussed in the economic literature, much less has been
published in terms of empirical evidence documenting its impact on suicide mortality. Some
headway in filling this gap has been made in recent years, with studies focusing on descrip-
tive or correlation analyses (see, for instance, Kentikelenis et al., 2011; Economou et al., 2011;
Kentikelenis et al., 2012; Fountoulakis et al., 2012; Karanikolos et al., 2013) and on single coun-
try time series (Antonakakis and Collins, 2014). In this study, we report the first systematic
multiple-country evidence of a relationship between fiscal consolidation and suicide mortality,
basing our analysis on a Eurozone periphery panel dataset, thereby covering a large share of
countries that have recently implemented fiscal consolidation in an attempt to restore confidence,
competitiveness, and macroeconomic stability.
The purpose and reasoning behind any economic policy intervention is, among others, to allo-
cate resources more efficiently. A wide range of policy areas have thus been explored via macroe-
conomic analyses ranging from extensive and repeated attention on unemployment, poverty re-
duction and economic development, and in some more limited work to macroeconomic analyses
of broad heath and wellbeing effects (see, among others, WHO, 2001; Subramanian et al., 2002;
Acemoglu et al., 2003; Andre´s, 2005; Suhrcke et al., 2006; Gudmundsdottir, 2013).
Despite the volume of studies on the above issues, much less is known on the mental health
effects of economic policy intervention, especially on suicide mortality. Given that one aspect
of any country citizens welfare is their mental health (as indicated by among other things,
suicide mortality), then arguably the impact on this of any economic policy choice should be
extensively scrutinised, in at least qualitative terms or even via cost-benefit arithmetic. Hence,
the provision of robust estimates of specific policy-induced suicide mortality are necessary to
satisfy these purposes.1 According to Lawson et al. (2014), the key drivers of population health
lie outside the health sector. Despite that, the authors argue that, decision makers outside
the health sector are primarily interested in delivering sector specific outputs other than health.
Thus, economic approaches to priority setting can help align sectors to consider the intersectoral
impacts of decisions within an integrated societal framework.
Following the global financial crisis of 2008, many European countries, especially in the Eu-
rozone periphery, experienced an increase in their budget deficits and government debts in late
2009. That raised fears about a chain reaction of sovereign defaults on the Eurozone peripheral
countries’ debt, and possible contagion to other core Eurozone countries, that led to a crisis of
confidence and a widening of bond yield spreads and credit default swaps between the Eurozone
peripheral countries and the Eurozone’s largest economy, Germany. These, developments have
ultimately initiated a European sovereign debt crisis that has resulted in large financial interven-
tions by individual governments and the ‘Troika’ (consisting of the European Commission (EC),
the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)) in the Euro-
zone peripheral countries. These policy interventions occurred in an attempt to avert potential
bankruptcies of highly indebted countries in the Eurozone periphery, potential contagion and
ultimately the collapse of the Eurozone itself. In particular, fiscal austerity packages consisted
of bailout packages to Eurozone peripheral countries that were accompanied by draconian and
unprecedented fiscal adjustment measures. These consisted of large spending cuts, tax hikes,
large privatisation schemes of publicly owned assets (with often largely overoptimistic initial sale
values) and structural reforms, so as to restore competitiveness, achieve fiscal sustainability and
promote growth.
1There is a well established link between unemployment and suicide, which tends to increase during economic
downturns, particularly where it’s not offset by welfare safety nets. For a more comprehensive list of suicide
mortality determinants, see Chen et al. (2012).
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Eventually, as business cycle theory suggests, every crisis comes to an end, and a ‘good’ policy
is marked by its success in making the downturn of the business cycle shallower and shorter than
it otherwise would have been. The controversy associated with austerity policies that many
governments adopted relates to whether they made the downturn far deeper and longer than
was necessary, with long-lasting consequences not only for wealth, but also for health. Thus a
natural and important question is whether fiscal consolidation will hurt economic performance
and health conditions over time.
In terms of the economic consequences, conventional wisdom suggests that reduction of debt
into sustainable levels has long–run benefits.2 However, there is no consensus reached yet on
the short–run, or even the medium–run effects of fiscal austerity. Keynesian economists might
suggest that spending cuts and tax hikes will reduce economic activity in the short–run (see, for
instance, Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). On the other hand, some economists argue that fiscal
consolidation may be expansionary even in the short–run, which is referred to as “expansionary
fiscal contraction” (see, for instance, Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990; Alesina and Perotti, 1995;
Giavazzi and Pagano, 1996; Giudice et al., 2004; Afonso, 2010; Alesina and Ardagna, 2010;
Alesina, 2010).3
Increasingly, the pursuit of fiscal consolidation is being recognized by some economists as
ineffective and prolonging the economic crisis unnecessarily (IMF, 2013).4 In light of Figure
1, the Eurozone debt crisis and the subsequent fiscal consolidation may be considered to have
led to a dramatic increase in government debts and deficits, deep recessions and skyrocketing
unemployment rates in the Eurozone periphery since 2009. In particular, between 2009 and
2013, unemployment rates in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain increased by 186.5%
(from 9.6% to 27.5%), 9.2% (from 12% to 13.1%), 56.4% (from 7.8% to 12.2%), 54.7% (from
10.6% to 16.4%) and 45.8% (from 17.9% to 26.1%), respectively. Youth unemployment in
the respective countries over that period increased by 126.8% (from 25.7% to 58.3%), 11.7%
(from 24.7% to 26.8%), 57.5% (from 25.4% to 40%), 51.8% (from 25.1% to 38.1%) and 47.2%
(from 37.7% to 55.5%). These figures are well above the Eurozone average increase of 26.3%
(from 9.5% to 12%) and 18.8% (from 20.2% to 24%) in overall unemployment rates and youth
unemployment rates, respectively. Labour market conditions in the Eurozone have worsened
(and are projected to continue to this course) due to fiscal consolidation, constituting to the
increase of unemployment rates (ILO, 2014) in the EU. According to ILO (2014), the current
fiscal consolidation measures and the cuts in government spending have heavily affected the
funds available for social programmes for the most vulnerable groups of women. In 2013, 45.2
million people where unemployed in the EU and it was forecasted that the unemployment rate
will gradually decline from 8.6% to 8% between 2013 and 2018, albeit, significantly above that
in 2008 (ILO, 2014). Real GDP per capita between 2009 and 2013 has seen a cumulative decline
of 22.3% in Greece, 0.74% in Ireland, 3.11% in Italy, 2.84% in Portugal, and 2.92% in Spain
as compared to the cumulative increase of 0.94% in the whole Eurozone according to Figure 1.
Finally, government debt as a percentage of GDP between the same period increased by 35.0%
(from 129.7% to 157.1%), 92.1% (from 64.4% to 123.7%), 13.9% (from 116.4% to 132.6%), 54.1%
(from 83.7% to 129%) and 73.9% (from 54% to 93.9%), in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and
2For a recent detailed discussion of the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy, see Afonso and Sousa (2012).
3The success or failure of fiscal consolidation depends on many factors, among which, its reliability on tax
hikes primarily, the perceived risk of sovereign default, the number of countries that simultaneously apply such
measures, and whether monetary policy is in position to offset budget cuts. For a discussion of these factors, see
IMF (2010). Quite recently, the fairness of fiscal consolidation has entered the pool of these factors (Kaplanoglou
et al., 2014).
4This is because any reduction in the fiscal deficit hurts the economy –at least in the short- to medium-term–,
as it denotes that the government sector has a less positive contribution to the economy, which is compounded
when the government is running a deficit.
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Spain, respectively, well above the Eurozone average government debt to GDP of 92.6% in 2013.
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
Despite the economic deterioration, the effects of the economic crisis and the fiscal adjust-
ments have to some extent been considered for health in the Eurozone periphery. Preliminary
evidence indicates that the economic crisis and the implementation of austerity measures have
worsened self-rated health status as well as several other health indicators (Kentikelenis et al.,
2011; Vandoros et al., 2013; Zavras et al., 2013), increased the incident of mental disorders and
alcohol abuse (Kentikelenis et al., 2011; Gili et al., 2013; Roca et al., 2013) and led to HIV
outbreaks (ECDC, 2012).5 Despite countries’ attempts to make savings by switching to generic
drugs, the policies that have been implemented to shift costs from the state to patients resulted
in medicines growing less affordable and increasingly hard to access (Arie, 2013). Data, however,
also suggest favourable health trends and a reduction of traffic deaths fatalities in the general
population during recessions (Stuckler et al., 2009).6 Moreover, egalitarian policies protecting
the most disadvantaged populations with strong social protections have proved to be effective
in decoupling the link between job losses and suicides (De Vogli, 2014).
Yet, the health effects have arguably not been consistently examined. Empirically robust
evidence on the link between fiscal consolidation policies and suicide mortality has only been
establish in Greece by Antonakakis and Collins (2014), or via descriptive and/or correlation
analyses in Greece and other Eurozone peripheral countries (see, for instance, Kentikelenis et al.,
2011; Economou et al., 2011; Kentikelenis et al., 2012; Fountoulakis et al., 2012; Karanikolos
et al., 2013).
To address this gap in the literature, we specifically investigate the effects of fiscal auster-
ity, among other socio-economic control variables, on suicide rates in all Eurozone peripheral
countries, namely, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain over the period 1968-2012. Our
empirical findings suggest that fiscal consolidation, higher unemployment rates, negative eco-
nomic growth and reduced fertility rates lead to signicant increases on overall suicide rates in the
Eurozone periphery. The effects of fiscal consolidation are gender, age and time specific, with
fiscal consolidation having short-, medium- and long-run suicide-increasing effects on the male
population between 65 and 89 years of age. In particular, a one percentage point reduction in
government spending leads to an 1.39%, 2.35% and 2.64% increase in the short-, medium- and
long-run, respectively, of male suicides rates between 65 and 89 years of age in the Eurozone pe-
riphery. In addition, unemployment benefits and substantial employment protection legislation
can mitigate the negative effects of fiscal consolidation on suicide mortality.
These results have potentially important implications for policy makers in economic and
health ministries across Europe. Economic and financial issues have been dominating policy
making in the Eurozone, while health and inequalities in health have arguably remained rela-
tively low key. Given that economic and social policy decisions have profound effects for health
and its fair distribution, health equity should perhaps be considered an important measure of
the effectiveness of social and economic policy making, in addition to wealth equity (see, for
instance, Marmot, 2012).
5Evidence also suggests that the Eurozone debt crisis and the policy responses disproportionately affected
vulnerable populations in society (see, e.g., Schaltegger and Weder, 2014, for the effects of fiscal consolidation
on income inequality).
6This is in line with the literature that finds that work-related, and other types accidents (e.g. due to drinking
and driving behaviours) are likely to become more common during temporary expansions of economic activity (see,
for instance, Evans and Graham, 1988; Ruhm, 1995). Dolan et al. (2014), however, finds that road traffic accidents
increased substantially in Greece on the first two days following the announcements of austerity measures.
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents some brief remarks
on the extant theory relating to suicide, outlines the sources of our theoretical expectations and
sets out our key research hypotheses. Section 3, specifies the empirical methodology and the
data used. Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 summarises and offers some
concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical Considerations and Key Hypotheses
Ultimately all macroeconomic policy is intended to enhance the welfare of residents in its own
economy and sometimes those in others as well. Numerous studies have explored the impact of
various macroeconomic phenomena on reported subjective wellbeing (Di Tella et al., 2001, 2003;
Alesina et al., 2004) typically presenting intuitively plausible results. Suicide, however, serves
as a very clear revealed objective measure of substantial life dissatisfaction and as a potential
indicator of wider mental health issues and wellbeing issues in a given economy. It has been long
been the subject of theoretical and empirical scrutiny. Durkheim (1897) and other sociologists
in their wake have posited a positive relationship between suicide and age premised on the level
of both social integration and social regulation in a given society. Economists too have entered
the arena led by Hamermesh and Soss (1974) who advanced a rationality driven model of suicide
founded on an assessment of the likely expected cumulative lifetime utility.
According to Hamermesh and Soss (1974), an individual i at age α with permanent income
Yp commits suicide if and when the total discounted lifetime utility, Zi, plus the individual’s
taste for living, or conversely, his distaste for suicide, bi, reaches zero:
Zi(α, Yp) + bi = 0 (1)
with the present value of the individual’s utility function defined as:
Zi(α, Yp) =
∫ ω
α
e−r(m−α)UmP (m)dm. (2)
where r is the private discount rate, ω is the highest attainable age, Um is the expected utility at
age m, and P (m) is the probability of survival to age m. Based on this model, the individual’s
expected utility, Um, is inversely related with age, m, and positively related to the individual’s
permanent income, Yp. The individual’s taste for living, bi, is assumed to be normally dis-
tributed, so that the age-adjusted aggregate suicide rate, defined as the fraction of individuals
in the age cohort a for whom Z(α, Yp) reaches −b, is inversely related to the permanent income,
Yp.
Therefore on the basis of this framework, Hamermesh and Soss (1974) posit a positive rela-
tionship between suicide rates and age, and an inverse relationship with permanent income which
can be expected to boost expected cumulative lifetime utility. The authors have empirically pre-
sented that these predictions hold over time and across US states. Based on the extensive and
very comprehensive review of studies presented in Chen et al. (2012), this study extracts a full
set of a priori expectations for the macroeconomic performance and socio–demographic control
variables based on the consensus readily discernible in the literature.7 These are set out in Table
3. However, in the context of fiscal consolidation (specifically public expenditure reductions) we
posit the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 : Fiscal consolidation (e.g. public expenditure reductions) will increase suicide
rates, via permanent income reductions.
7For a comprehensive list of suicide determinants see Chen et al. (2012)
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Hypothesis 2 : Fiscal consolidation will impact significantly differently across age cohorts. Specif-
ically, we postulate that older age cohorts will be more likely to commit suicide as a consequence
of fiscal austerity than younger age cohorts, given their reliance on fixed incomes and arguably
less suicide offsetting behaviours (such as migration) being perceived to be available to them.
For those individuals subject to pension reductions, clearly their permanent income is directly
impacted and as Hamermesh and Soss (1974) would indicate this is posited to increase the
suicide rate.
Hypothesis 3 : The effects of fiscal consolidation on suicide rates will have both contemporaneous
and lagged effects, consistent with the idea that consolidation may elicit their effects with some
delay. Put differently, individuals might respond with some delay to changes in fiscal policy,
thus dynamics should be incorporated in the econometric model.
Hypothesis 4 : The effects of fiscal consolidation on suicide rates will be dampened by better
labour market institutions. In particular, unemployment benefits and employment protection
legislation would serve to mitigate the negative effects of fiscal consolidation on the most dis-
tressed and vulnerable part of the population.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
To conduct our analysis, we collect annual observations of suicide statistics for Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal and Spain between 1968 and 2012. Suicide data (defined as number of deaths
by suicide and self-inflicted injury/intentional self-harm, based on the following international
classification of diseases (ICD) codes, ICD-7 codes E963 and E970-E979, ICD-8 and ICD-9
codes E950-E959, ICD-10 codes X60-X84) and population data are extracted from the World
Health Organization (WHO) Mortality Database and are extended up to 2012 with data on
suicide and population supplemented from the official national statistics of each country and
Eurostat, respectively. A snapshot of these series is presented in Table 1. Panel A of Table 1
reveals that the number of overall suicides between 2009 and 2012 (and 2011 for Italy) have
increased by 30% (from 391 to 508) in Greece, by 4.56% (from 3971 to 4152) in Italy, by 4%
(from 1025 to 1066) in Portugal, by 3.21% (from 3429 to 3539) in Spain, and declined by 3.8%
(from 527 to 507) in Ireland. Similar changes have also been experienced by male and female
suicides. Worryingly, since 2009, the number and rate of suicides are, in general, above their
1968-2012 average values.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
Based on the above data, we convert the number of suicides to suicide rates per 100,000
inhabitants, broken down by age and gender in each country. Selected years for these series
reported in Panel B of Table 1, reveal similar trends as those for the number of suicides in Panel
A of the same table.
Overall unemployment rate data have been obtained from the Annual Macro-Economic
(AMECO) database of the European Commission, while gender-specific unemployment rates
from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database maintained by the World Bank. The
evolution of unemployment rates together with suicide rates, which is presented in Figure 2, is
quite revealing. In particular, unemployment rates and suicide rates seem to be highly corre-
lated. In fact, the correlation between overall suicide rates and unemployment rates is Greece,
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Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain is 0.57, 0.09, 0.86, 0.36 and 0.68, while between male sui-
cide rates and male unemployment rates, in the respective countries, is 0.77, -0.59, 0.78, 0.47
and -0.11, and between female suicide rates and female unemployment rates the correlation, in
the respective countries, is -0.35, -0.39, 0.81, 0.43 and 0.45, over the period 1968-2012. It is
thus clear, that the link between suicide mortality and unemployment is gender and country
specific, indicating the necessity to take into account the gender heteogeneity and control for
country-specific effects in the empirical analysis.
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
Table 2 presents suicide rates by time, 5-year age groups and by sex, for a selection of years.
According to this table, there is also clear evidence that suicide rates increase with age and
that males are more prone to commit suicide than females are, and which are in line with the
theoretical justications of Hamermesh and Soss (1974) and Durkheim (1897).
[Insert Table 2 around here]
In Figure 3 which plots the Eurozone 5 peripheral countries’ average suicide rates by age
group and gender, reinforces the aforementioned age and gender heterogeneity. Nevertheless, it
is also depicts a positive trend of suicide rates overtime, which is more pronounced in the male
population. This indicates the necessity to control for Eurozone periphery-wide time-effects in
the analysis.
[Insert Figure 3 around here]
In order to examine the effects of fiscal consolidation on suicide rates, we use several variables
as proxies of fiscal consolidation. Given the large scale reductions in public sector salaries and
pensions in the Eurozone peripheral countries, our principal proxy of fiscal consolidation is
government expenditure. We collect data for general government final consumption expenditure
as a % of GDP from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) database.8 For
robustness purposes we also use a fiscal consolidation episodes indicator (FCE) based on Afonso
(2010), the budget deficit, and taxes, as proxies of fiscal austerity (see below). In addition, we
collect data on per capita real GDP growth from WDI so as to examine the cyclical nature of
suicide mortality. Finally, to control for social and demographic factors on suicide rates and
to minimize errors arising from unobserved effects, we collect data for fertility rates from the
World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) database and Eurostat; alcohol consumption
from OECD Health database and divorce rates from EUROSTAT. Definitions, expected signs
and descriptive statistics for all these variables are included in Table 3.
[Insert Table 3 around here]
In Figure 4 we present the evolution of some of the macroeconomic series over the period
1968-2012 that are used in this study. According to this figure, economic growth, budget deficit
and public debt deteriorated since 2009, while government expenditure was severely cut since
2009 in the Eurozone periphery.
[Insert Figure 4 around here]
8Given that this measure might produce biased results during period when nominal GDP is falling, such as the
period of the financial crisis, we have explored the robustness of our results by dividing general government final
consumption expenditure by real GDP or by population. Our results, which are available upon request, remain
qualitatively and quantitatively almost identical. This is due to the fact that the correlation between the three
alternative measures is very high, namely 0.7521 and 0.7465, respectively.
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3.2 Empirical Methodology
We estimate variants of the following specification:
Sijkt = α+ Sijkt−1β1 + Fitβ2 + Fit−1β3 + Eitλ+Ditµ+ γi + δt + εit (3)
where Sijkt is the log of suicide rates in country i (where i = Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
Spain), population j (where j = overall, male, female), age group k (where k = all, 10–24, 25–44,
45–64, 65–89) and time t (where t = 1968,...,2012); α is a constant; Sijkt−1 is the first lag of Sijkt
and is included to account for dynamic effects and to filter autocorrelation of order one, AR(1),
found in the series;9 Eit is a vector of economic characteristics affecting suicide rates, such as
the growth rate of real GDP, Growthit, and the unemployment rate, Unempit; Fit is the fiscal
consolidation variable proxied by: (i) the first difference of the natural logarithm of government
expenditure as a % of GDP, Gov Expit, (ii) the first difference of budget deficit as a % of
GDP, Defit, (iii) government tax revenues as a % of GDP, Taxit, and iv) fiscal consolidation
episodes (FCE) indicator based on Afonso (2010). We also include a one period lag of the fiscal
consolidation variable, Fit−1, so as to control for any time delayed effects of fiscal consolidation
on suicide mortality. Dit is a vector of demographic and social characteristics affecting suicide
rates, such as alcohol consumption, Alcit, divorce rate, Divorceit and fertility rate, Fertit. γi
denotes country fixed–effects controlling for time–invariant country characteristics, and δt is
a linear time trend, controlling for Eurozone periphery-wide time trends. The fixed–effects
estimates are used to exploit within–country variations in economic conditions and have the
potential to improve on time series analyses if there are substantial independent socio-economic
fluctuations across countries over time. εit is the error term.
The intuition for incorporating the range of right-hand side variables deployed in this study
follows the consensus evident in the recent literature surveyed by Chen et al. (2012). Andre´s
(2005) and Viren (2005) establish a significant linkage between economic growth and suicide.
Given positive economic growth enhances occupational and financial opportunities, people are
more likely to be hopeful decreasing the probability of suicide. In a similar vein, unemployment
serves as a predictor of future income and thus rising unemployment should be expected to
lead to an increasing incidence of suicide and suicide attempts. Further, suicide may also be
associated with a range of mental and physical illnesses that may raise the probability of suicidal
behaviour.
In the seminal work of Durkheim (1897) suicide mortality was postulated to be strongly
influenced by social regulations and its degree of integration. Arguably, divorce and fertility
rates may be presented as indicators of social integration. Durkheim specifically highlights
divorce as serving to reduce social integration and family ties resulting in stress, shame and
a greater disposition towards suicidality. Accordingly, higher divorce rates tends to be related
9Given that the lagged dependent variable, Sijkt, is correlated with the fixed effects, this gives rise to ’dynamic
panel bias’ (Nickell, 1981) that inflates the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable by attributing predictive
power to it that actually belongs to the country’s fixed effect. According to Judson and Owen (1999) the so-
called least-squares dummy-variables (LSDV) estimator bias is present for panels with small time, T , dimension.
A potential solution to this bias (and to potential endogeneity of other right-hand side variables), is to use a
generalised method of moments (GMM) approach, e.g. system-GMM. However, this approach is designed for
small time, T , dimension and large individual (country), N , dimension panels (for a discussion, see Roodman,
2009). Based on the fact that our panel consists of large T = 44 and small N = 5, and as Judson and Owen
(1999) show that, based on Monte Carlo analysis, the LSDV estimator performs equally well or better than many
alternatives when the time dimension is large (T=30), we thus employ the LSDV estimator as recommended by
Judson and Owen (1999). However, all of our results using the LSDV estimator that are presented below are similar
to those obtained using the (one-step) system-GMM estimator (that is robust to substantial heteroskedasticity)
derived by Arellano and Bond (1991), and further developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) and Arellano and Bover
(1995). The latter results are available upon request.
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to higher suicide rates (see, for example Minoiu and Andres, 2008; Brainerd, 2001; Neumayer,
2003, among others).
Durkheim (1897) and Andre´s (2005) make the case for fertility rate to be viewed as an
indicator of social integration, suggesting high fertility rates are related to lower suicidality. The
absence of children is thus associated by them with greater fluidity in family integration and
social ties. Finally, Neumayer (2003) and Andre´s (2005) find that, individuals with a higher
alcohol consumption are more likely to commit suicide.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Baseline Results: Short-run Effects
In Tables 4, 5 and 6 we report the main results with particular focus onto the short–run effects
of fiscal consolidation on the overall, male and female population, respectively, in the Eurozone
periphery.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
[Insert Table 5 around here]
[Insert Table 6 around here]
Turning to the results of Table 4, we observe that suicide rates are very persistent as the
coefficient of the one year lagged dependent variable has a statistically significant positive effect
on current suicide rates. Downturns of economic activity increase suicide rates across all ages.
This result is in line with Breuer (2014). For instance, a one percentage point decline in a
Eurozone periphery country’s growth rate of real GDP per capita increases suicide rates of the
population across all ages by 0.8%, and of the population between 10 and 44, and 65 and 89 years
of age by around 1%. Moreover, the results of Table 4 suggest that increases in unemployment
leads to significant increases in overall suicides rates of 10–24 years of age, with a one percentage
point increase in a Eurozone periphery country’s unemployment rate leading to a 1.12% increase
in suicide rates in that age group. These results are in line with Breuer (2014) and Ruhm (2000).
Breuer (2014) finds that, for European regions, a one percentage point increase in a European
region’s unemployment rate is predicted to increase suicide rates of working age population by
about 0.87%, while the latter authors find that for the U.S., a one percentage point increase in
a state’s unemployment rate is predicted to increase overall suicide rates by about 1.3%. Our
results are also quite similar to Stuckler et al. (2009) who find that, for 26 European countries,
a 1 percentage point increase in unemployment is associated with a 0.79% rise in suicide at ages
younger than 65 years. Unemployment is the leading cause of youth suicides in the Eurozone
periphery, and as youth unemployment has deteriorated substantially in the eurozone periphery
(see Figure 1), this is an alarming figure. Fertility rates are negatively related to suicide rates,
especially in the overall population between the ages of 10 and 24, 25 and 44, and 65 and 89 in
the Eurozone periphery.
Turning our attention to the impact of fiscal consolidation on suicide rates, we find that,
fiscal consolidation is also a significant predictor of suicide mortality, having both significant
contemporaneous and lagged effects on suicide rates across various age groups. In particular,
reductions in government spending lead to contemporaneous increases in suicides rates in the
population group of 45-64 and, especially, in the 65-89 group, while with one year lag increases
in suicide rates in the population groups of 10-14, 25-44 and 65-89. For instance, for each one
percentage point reduction in a Eurozone periphery country’s government spending, the suicide
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rate of the population between 65 and 89 is predicted to rise by about 1.09% (-0.67% plus -
0.42%) in the short-run. This seems plausible, since the oldest age groups are naturally likely
to be more inflexible following implementation of any fiscal consolidation that would reduce
their incomes (especially from pensions). Younger segments of the population affected by fiscal
austerity measures have a wider range of perceived opportunities beyond suicide. Finally, alcohol
consumption or divorce rates do not exert any significant influence on suicide mortality in the
overall population and across all ages in the Eurozone periphery.
Moving to the results for the male population reported in Table 5, it may be observed that
they are similar to those for the overall population. In particular, government spending cuts,
negative economic growth, reduced fertility rates and, to a lesser extent, increased unemployment
have a significantly positive impact on male suicide rates. The male population group that is
most heavily affected by spending cuts is the one between the 65 and 89 years of age. In
this group, a one percentage point reduction in a Eurozone periphery country’s government
spending is significantly associated with a contemporaneous and a year lag increase of 0.82%
and 0.57%, respectively, in male suicide rates. That is, for every one percentage point reduction
in a Eurozone periphery country’s government spending, the suicide rate of the male population
between 65 and 89 is predicted to rise by about 1.39% (= −0.82% plus −0.57%; column (10) of
Table 5). Put differently, the short–run impact or ‘health’ multiplier of fiscal consolidation on
male suicides in the 65-89 year group is -1.39%. To put things into perspective, final consumption
expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the Eurozone periphery declined on average by 0.883
percentage points in t = 2011 (from 20.343% in 2010, to 19.46% in 2011) and by 0.822 percentage
points in t−1 = 2010 (from 21.165% in 2009, to 20.343% in 2010), resulting in a 2.37%(= 1.705×
1.39%) increase in male suicide rates between 65 and 89 years in the Eurozone periphery on
average in 2011. Given that the Eurozone periphery average male population in the 65-89 group
in 2011 was 2,064,061, the 2.37% increase corresponds to 49 suicides in a Eurozone periphery
country on average in 2011 solely due to fiscal consolidation. Following this approach, the
number of males in the 65-89 age group who committed suicide solely due to fiscal consolidation
in 2012 amounted to 44. Put differently, between 2011 and 2012, 93 males between the ages of
65-89 committed suicide in any Eurozone periphery country on average due to, ceteris paribus,
fiscal consolidation; or 10.76% (= (93/(456 + 404) × 100)) of all the suicides recorded in every
Eurozone periphery country on average in 2011 and 2012, was due to fiscal austerity. In other
words, 465(= 5 × 93) males in the 65-89 age group committed suicide in the whole Eurozone
periphery between 2011 and 2012 due to fiscal consolidation measures.
In contrast, fiscal consolidation does not seem to have had any significant contemporaneous
impact on female suicide rates. However, there are suicide–increasing effects for female in the
25-44 age group with a year lag of the implementation of austerity. For every one percentage
point reduction in a Eurozone periphery country’s government spending, the suicide rate of the
female population between the ages of 25 and 44 is predicted to rise by 0.76%. The females in all
the other age groups seem to be resilient to fiscal consolidation measures. Fertility rates, divorce
rates and alcohol consumption are also significant predictors of female suicides. In particular,
increases in fertility rates (alcohol consumption) have significant suicide–reducing effects among
the female population between the ages of 45 and 89 (between the ages of 10 and 24, and 65 and
89), while increases in divorce rates lead to a significant increase of female suicide rates between
the ages of 45 and 89 years of age.
Overall, these results suggest that suicides rates in the Eurozone periphery are of a persistent
nature, and that the effects of economic growth, unemployment, spending cuts, fertility rates,
divorce rates and alcohol consumption on suicide mortality are age and gender specific. More
importantly, these results suggest that economic policies, such as fiscal consolidation, can also
have an impact on suicide mortality, and potentially offer some guidance on the demographic
10
targeting of suicide prevention measures for the population of the debt-stricken economies in
the Eurozone periphery.
4.2 Medium- and Long-run Effects
So far, fiscal consolidation has been assumed to have only a contemporaneous and a year lag
effect, i.e. short–run impact, on suicide mortality. In order to provide information on the
potential medium– and long–run effects of the fiscal adjustment process on suicide mortality,
we: i) re–estimate model (3) with the inclusion of five year lags of fiscal consolidation and use
the resulting estimates to summarize the predicted impact of a sustained one percentage point
decline in government expenditure that begins in year t and continues through t+510 (in similar
fashion as in Ruhm, 2000), and ii) calculate the long–run multiplier of fiscal austerity on suicide
based on the following equation:
βLR =
βˆ2 + βˆ3
1 − βˆ1
(4)
The results of the medium–run effects of fiscal consolidation on suicides rates are reported
in Table 7, while the cumulative adjustment path of suicide rates is presented in Figure 5.
[Insert Table 7 around here]
[Insert Figure 5 around here]
According to Table 7 and Figure 5, we observe that, although that the time profile varies
with age and gender, a sustained cut in government spending is strongly associated with both
short-run and medium-run increases in suicide rates in the Eurozone periphery, lasting up to five
years following the application of fiscal consolidation. However, this varies across gender and
age. In particular, persistent cuts in government spending significantly increase suicide rates of
males across all ages in the medium–run, while no significant medium–run effects on the female
population could be identified in the Eurozone periphery. The latter group seems to be resilient
to sustained budget cuts in the medium run, as only contemporaneous and one year lag effects of
budget cuts have a significant positive impact on female suicide mortality in the 65-89 and 25-44
age group in the Eurozone periphery. The age group most heavily affected by sustained budget
cuts is the male population in the 65-89 age group, followed be males in the 25-44 age group.
For instance, the expected bottom-line (medium-run) effect of a sustained one percentage point
decline in a Eurozone periphery’s government spending, according to Figure 5, is an increase of
2.35% (= 0.92% + 0.77% + 0.66%) in the suicide rates of males in the 65-89 year group. Given
that final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the Eurozone periphery declined
on average by 3.55 percentage points11 from 2009 to 2014 (i.e. in 5 years), the medium-run
effects of fiscal consolidation translate to a 8.33% (3.55 × 2.35%) increase in male suicide rates
in every Eurozone periphery country on average due to sustained fiscal consolidation. Based
on data for population projections from Eurostat (code: proj 13npms), the male population of
10The choice of a five–year lag is based upon the fact that: i) the coefficient of the sixth lag in the overall, male
and female suicide mortality equation has a p-value greater than 0.10, and ii) given that fiscal consolidation, at
the time of the writing of this study, is pursued for the 5th consecutive year, it seems warranted to assess its
medium term impact on suicide mortality.
11The 3.55 is derived by the sum of the 0.822, 0.883 and 0.614 percentage point decline in government spending
as a % of GDP between 2009 and 2010, 2010 and 2011, and 2011 and 2012, respectively, and by (because of data
anavailability) the scenario of assuming the same 0.614 percentage point decline in government spending as a %
of GDP between 2012 and 2013 and between 2013 and 2014.
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65-89 years in the Eurozone periphery on average is projected to be 2,444,577 in 2014, resulting
in 204 predicted male suicides in every Eurozone periphery country on average due to sustained
fiscal austerity between 2009 and 2014. Put differently, 1020 male suicides between the ages of
65 and 89 are predicted to have been committed in the whole Eurozone periphery between 2009
and 2014 due to sustained fiscal consolidation.
Apart from the short-run (impact multiplier) and the medium-run effects of fiscal consoli-
dation on suicide rates obtained above, we can also compute the long–run multiplier of fiscal
consolidation on suicides rates based on equation (4). This stems from the fact that results
of fiscal consolidation and their associated repercussions could have long-lasting impacts on
the mental health of the most deprived sections of the population in the Eurozone periphery.
According to Table 8, the long–run multiplier of fiscal austerity on overall and male suicide
rates of the population between 65 and 89 years of age is −2.77%(= −0.0060/(1− 0.6958)) and
−2.64%(= −0.0062/(1 − 0.7305)), respectively. That is, for every one percentage point cut in
a Eurozone periphery’s government spending, the suicide rates of the male population between
the 65 and 89 years of age is predicted to increase by 2.64%. To put things into perspective,
final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP in a Eurozone periphery country on
average declined by 1.705 percentage points (0.822 percentage points in t− 1 = 2010 and 0.883
percentage points in t = 2011), resulting in a 4.5% (= 1.705× 2.64%) long-run increase in male
suicide rates in the 65-89 age group because of fiscal consolidation. Again, based on population
projections from Eurostat (code: proj 13npms), the male population of 65-89 years in the Euro-
zone periphery on average is projected to be 2,355,280 in 202012, resulting in a 106 elderly male
suicides in the long-run in every Eurozone periphery country on average, or in 530 elderly male
suicides in the whole Eurozone periphery in the long run as a result of fiscal consolidation. This
might, at first glance, seem contradictory to earlier results. However, it can be readily explained
by the fact that, in the long run, people will be able to ‘adjust’ to the situation more efficiently
(e.g. via migration, or, given the life expectancy of this age group, death, due to natural causes)
compared to the short- or medium-run. In the short- or medium-run, resources and flexibility
are limited, leaving little or no space to manoeuvre. Yet, the number of suicides associated with
fiscal consolidation is still very high, even in the long-run.
[Insert Table 8 around here]
Overall, these results suggest that the effects of fiscal consolidation have long lasting effects
on suicide rates of the aforementioned parts of the population in the Eurozone periphery.
4.3 Robustness Analysis
4.3.1 Alternative Proxies of Fiscal Consolidation
In this section we examine the robustness of our results by using alternative proxies of fiscal con-
solidation. In particular, we estimate model (3) with the following alternative fiscal consolidation
proxies (based on data from the AMECO database):
1. budget deficit as a percentage of GDP. Specifically, we include the first difference of gov-
ernment budget deficit as a % of GDP, Defit.
12The 2020 year is considered as the benchmark long-run run scenario, based on the fact that at least the Greek
government is bound to the Troika’s bailout scheme and the corresponding structural adjustments till 2020.
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2. A fiscal consolidation episodes (FCE) indicator based on Afonso (2010) defined as:
FCEit =

1, if ∆bit > γσ,
1, if
∑1
k=0 ∆bit−k/2 > σ,
0, otherwise,
(5)
where b is the primary structural budget balance in country i and time t, and σ is the
standard deviation for the EU15 (specifically, σEU15 = 1.25) while γ is applied to determine
a multiple of the standard deviation.13 Following Afonso (2010) we use γ = 1.5.14 Hence, a
fiscal consolidation episode occurs when either the change in the primary cyclically adjusted
balance is at least one and a half times the standard deviation in one year, or when the
change in the primary cyclically adjusted balance is at least one standard deviation on
average in the last 2 years.
3. government tax revenues expressed as a percentage of GDP, Taxt.
Additionally, we include one period lag of the fiscal consolidation proxy variables, i.e., FCEit−1,
Defit−1 and Taxit−1, so as to control for any time delayed effects of fiscal consolidation on
suicide mortality. The results of this analysis are presented in Tables A.1 - A.9 in the Appendix.
According to these results, reductions in budget deficits have a significantly positive and
instantaneous impact on male suicides in the age group of 65-89, while a significantly positive
but with a year lag on female suicides in the same age group in the Eurozone periphery. Based
on the fiscal consolidation episodes indicator as used in Afonso (2010), the results are quite
similar. In particular, suicide rates of males in the oldest groups (65-89, and 45-64) significantly
and contemporaneously increase following a fiscal consolidation episode. These results are in
line with our main findings, that fiscal consolidation mostly affects the elderly male population.
Moreover, higher tax revenues by governments in the Eurozone periphery significantly increase
suicide rates only of the male population between the ages of 25 and 44 within a year.15 A
potential explanation for this effect is that, the 25-44 male age group of the population consists
of potential entrepreneurs who are thinking of starting a new (or already run a) business, but
are strongly affected by their inability to pay taxes, leading to business closures, income losses,
depression and, eventually, suicide. Finally, the coefficients of the remaining socio-economic
determinants are in line with our main findings. For instance, higher divorce rates and lower
fertility rates significantly increase suicide mortality mostly among both the male and female
elderly population in the Eurozone periphery.
4.3.2 The Role of Labour Market Institutions
As a final robustness check, we explore whether labour market institutions have an influence on
job satisfaction and the quality of life, and ultimately on suicide mortality.16
13Using the first difference of the primary structural budget balance as a % of GDP, ∆bit, also known as fiscal
impulse, it allows us to correct of the effects on budget balance from changes in economic activity such as inflation
or real interest rates.
14According to Afonso (2010), there is an element of arbitrariness with the choice of γ. In this particular case,
1.5σ corresponds to 1.875 percentage points of GDP, thus indicating a more demanding threshold to determine a
fiscal episode.
15There is also a negative and contemporaneous effect of higher tax revenues on male suicide mortality in
the 25–44 age group. However, the overall short–run effect of a one percentage point increase in a Eurozone
periphery’s taxes is an increase in males suicide rates in the 25–44 age group by 1.09%(= −2.17% + 3.26%); see
column (6) in Table A.8.
16Breuer and Rottmann (2014) examine the effects of labour market institutions, among other socio-economic
factors, on suicide mortality in a panel of 25 OECD (advanced) countries, and find that unemployment benefits
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Theoretically, this can occur in the following ways: (i) stricter labour market regulations
and higher unemployment benefits could mitigate some of the negative effects of income loss of
workers in the case of unemployment during period of negative economic activity and (ii) they
will be comparable to a social security system for employees in a private market, acting as safety
nets in the risk of unemployment.17
To conduct this final robustness check, and following Breuer and Rottmann (2014), we collect
data for an indicator of employment protection legislation (EPL version EPRC V1) from OECD
database.18 This indicator is available between 1985 and 2013. There also exists another very
closely related indicator of employment protection legislation developed by Allard (2005) over the
period 1950-2003.19 Thus, to increase the amount of observations and consequently predictive
power of the results, we obtain the annual growth rate of the Allard (2005) indicator from 1985
to 1968, and apply it backwards to the OECD EPL indicator starting in 1984. Our indicator
of unemployment benefit is proxied by the gross replacement rate (GRR), which is defined as
gross unemployment benefit level as a percentage of previous gross earnings and obtained from
OECD labour market statistics database.20
In Tables 9 - 11 we present the results with the aforementioned indicators of labour market in-
stitutions. According to these results, substantial employment protection legislation –especially
that supporting older aged segments of the population– and higher unemployment benefits have
significantly suicide–reducing effects on both sexes and age groups. The latter (former) result is
partially in line (contrasts) with those in Breuer and Rottmann (2014). In the presence of im-
proved labour market institutions and unemployment benefits, a one unit increase in a Eurozone
periphery country’s employment protection legislation indicator and gross replacement ratio (i.e.
unemployment benefits) indicator is predicted to decrease male suicide rates in the age group of
65-89 by 5.19% and 0.36%, respectively (see column (10) of Table 10), and thus mitigate some
of the negative effects of fiscal consolidation on suicide mortality. In particular, given that the
population of males in the age group of 65-89 in 2011 was, on average, 2,064,061 in the Euro-
zone periphery, 107 and 7 suicides could have been avoided in a Eurozone periphery country
on average in 2011, due to more substantial employment protection legislation and improved
unemployment benefits, respectively. However, in reality, the indicator of employment protec-
tion legislation and unemployment benefits declined by 0.1556 and 1.0101 units, respectively, in
2011 (compared to 2010), thus leading to an increase in male suicides between 65 and 89 years
of age by 0.81% and 0.36%, respectively. In other words, 17 and 8 male suicides in the 65-89
age group occurred in 2011 in every Eurozone periphery country on average, or, 85(= 17 × 5)
and 40(= 8 × 5) male suicides in the 65-89 age group occurred in the whole Eurozone periph-
ery, due to the deterioration of employment protection legislation and unemployment benefits,
respectively.
decrease male suicides, while relatively strict employment protection regulations are positive related with suicide
mortality of both genders.
17For a detailed discussion on the potential channels, see Breuer and Rottmann (2014).
18The EPL (version EPRC V1) indicator is defined as an indicator of the strictness of employment protection
of regular workers against individual and collective dismissals, and can be retrieved from: http://www.oecd.org/
employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm#data.
19In fact the correlation between the OECD EPL and the Allard (2005) indicators of employment protection
legislation for the overlapping periods (1985-2003) in the Eurozone periphery is very high, namely 0.992.
20The series can be retrieved from www.oecd.org/els/soc/GRR_EN.xlsx. This indicator comes in two versions:
(i) GRRAPW from 1961 to 2005 and (ii) GRRAW between 2001 and 2011. The former is calibrated to the average
productive worker, while the latter is calibrated to average worker. Both indicators are available in uneven years.
We fill missing values for both series by linear interpolation and extend the GRRAPW indicator with the growth
rate of GRRAW from 2005 to 2011. Thus we end up with a combined indicator of unemployment benefits between
1968 and 2011.
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[Insert Table 9 around here]
[Insert Table 10 around here]
[Insert Table 11 around here]
Summing up, these results suggest that the negative effects of economic downturns and fiscal
consolidation could be mitigated by the adoption of redistributive policies and by investing in
some specific elements of stronger social protection in the Eurozone periphery; and are in line
with Kaplanoglou et al. (2014) who find that, improving the targeting of social transfers and their
effectiveness in terms of poverty alleviation, higher public expenditure on training and active
labour market policies and programmes like social housing directed to the poor, even decreasing
the VAT rate on necessities, improve the success probabilities of consolidation attempts. Overall,
these results have also important implications for policy makers in the domain of economics and
health across Europe. Economic and financial issues have been dominating policy making in
the Eurozone, while health and inequalities in health remaining relatively low key in policy
discussion. Given that economic and social policy decisions have profound effects on health and
its fair distribution, health equity should be an important measure of the effectiveness of social
and economic policy making, in addition to wealth equity (Marmot, 2012).
5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
The 2008 global financial crisis that subsequently transformed to a fully-fledged Eurozone
sovereign debt in crisis in 2009, has clearly highlighted the health effects experienced by coun-
tries, such as the peripheral Eurozone countries, that have been heavily affected by soaring
unemployment, financial distress and slumps in economic activity. Unprecedented policy inter-
ventions have been experienced in the peripheral debt-stricken Eurozone economies in an an
attempt to restore confidence, competitiveness, and macroeconomic stability.
However, the timing, scope, size and necessity of the policy responses, comprising mainly
bank bailouts and austerity programmes, in most European countries still remains controversial,
and has led to concerns about their economic and health effects. Not only crises, but also
economic policy responses can lead to increased suicide mortality, widen inequalities in both
wealth and health, and undermine the social fabric of the society. Clearly, the Eurozone debt
crisis –especially in the peripheral Eurozone countries that have been heavily affected by the
crisis and the policy responses – is not over, and it seems to be transforming into a health crisis.
Prospects for economic and health recovery remain quite uncertain and fragile.
In this study, we explore the impact of fiscal consolidation on suicide mortality across all
Eurozone peripheral economies, while controlling for various economic and socio-demographic
differences. Based on several proxies of fiscal consolidation and robustness checks, the empirical
regularities of this study reveal that the impact of fiscal adjustments is gender, age and time
specific. In particular, fiscal consolidation has short-, medium- and long-run suicide increasing
effects on the male population between 65 and 89 years of age. A one percentage point reduction
in a Eurozone periphery country’s government spending leads to an increase of 1.39%, 2.35%
and 2.64% in the short-, medium- and long-run, respectively, of male suicides rates between 65
and 89 years of age in the Eurozone periphery. In addition, unemployment benefits and strict
employment protection legislation can mitigate some of the negative effects of fiscal consolidation
on suicide mortality.
These results have important implications for policy makers in the domain of economics and
health across Europe. Economic and financial issues have been dominating policy making in
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the Eurozone, while health and inequalities in health remained relatively low key. Given that
economic and social policy decisions have profound effects for health and its fair distribution,
health equity should be an important measure of the effectiveness of social and economic policy
making, in addition to wealth equity.
The case is strong for governments, as well as European leaders and policy makers, who
arguably need to intervene more boldly to protect the most vulnerable and distressed populations
from the effects of the crisis and the subsequent fiscal consolidation/austerity measures. That
is, different policy sectors should be encouraged to consider and value all major intersectoral
impacts of economic policy to society as a whole, including health. Thus, a reevaluation of
the fiscal adjustment programme design in the Eurozone periphery seems to be warranted.
For instance, by adopting redistributive policies and by targeted investment in some particular
aspects of social protection, governments can promote sustainable health and minimize some
of the negative effects of the crisis and fiscal consolidation on health. Targeted social welfare
programmes could mitigate the effect of some economic disasters upon suicide mortality. Put
differently, we advocate a paradigm shift in political economy to set a new course of policy
development where markets and profits are explicitly means to human ends and not the other
way around. That is, placing health before wealth.
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Figure 1: Government debt, deficit, unemployment rate, and real GDP per capita (growth),
2007–2013
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Figure 2: Suicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants (%) and Unemployment rates (%), by country,
1968–2012
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Figure 3: Average suicide rates by age group and gender in the Eurozone periphery, 1968–2012
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Figure 4: Real per capita GDP growth, government expenditure, budget deficit and public debt,
1968–2012
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Figure 5: Cumulative effect of a sustained one percentage point reduction in Eurozone periphery
government spending on suicide rates
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Table 7: Medium-run predicted effect of a sustained one percentage point reduction in govern-
ment spending beginning in year t
Panel A: overall suicide rates
Age t t + 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4 t+ 5
All ages 0.26% 0.38%** 0.01% -0.01% 0.02% 0.32%*
10–24 years -0.12% 0.52% -0.18% 0.50%◦ -0.42% 0.29%
25–44 years 0.10% 0.71%** 0.39% -0.16% 0.26% 0.69%**
45–64 years 0.33% -0.19% 0.04% -0.03% 0.07% 0.39%◦
65–89 years 0.67%** 0.52%** -0.17% 0.50%◦ 0.01% 0.03%
Panel B: male suicide rates
Age t t + 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4 t+ 5
All ages 0.38%◦ 0.35%◦ -0.05% 0.05% 0.16% 0.36%**
10–24 years 0.12% 0.70%◦ 0.05% 0.37% -0.50% 0.39%
25–44 years 0.25% 0.74%** 0.51%◦ -0.11% 0.37% 0.89%***
45–64 years 0.58%*** -0.27% -0.29%◦ 0.09% 0.36% 0.38%◦
65–89 years 0.92%** 0.77%** 0.01% 0.66%** 0.35% 0.33%
Panel C: female suicide rates
Age t t + 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4 t+ 5
All ages 0.08% 0.52%◦ 0.10% -0.24% -0.32% 0.09%
10–24 years -0.70% 0.21% 0.02% 0.05% 0.13% 0.30%
25–44 years -0.11% 0.74%◦ 0.10% -0.29% -0.04% -0.02%
45–64 years 0.18% 0.07% 0.59% -0.08% -0.60% 0.28%
65–89 years 1.00%◦ 0.31% -0.35% 0.79% -0.07% -0.23%
Note: Entries show the predicted effect of a one percentage point decrease in the Eurozone periphery government
spending beginning in year t and continuing through year t + 5. These predictions are made using the results
of regressions similar to those in Tables 4, 5 and 6, with the only exception of the inclusion of fiscal austerity
variable lagged up to 5 year periods. ◦, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 8: Long–run multiplier of fiscal consolidation on suicide rates
Overall suicide rates Male suicide rates Female suicide rates
All ages - - -
10–24 years - - -
25–44 years - - -
45–64 years - - -
65–89 years -2.77% -2.64% -
Note: The long–run multiplier is computed according to equation 4 only for the cases where all the coefficients
βˆ1, βˆ2 and βˆ3 are significant at least at the 10% level in Tables 4, 5 and 6.
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